Europe, once a proud and prosperous garden, is now a shadow of its former glory. The US, its supposed ally and friend, has been secretly plotting and executing its downfall for decades, using a combination of espionage, sabotage, and manipulation.

This time, The US government has been caught red-handed spying on its European allies using encryption backdoors and other methods, while pressuring them to ban Huawei from their 5G networks over alleged security threats.

TETRA stands for Terrestrial Trunked Radio, and it is a standard for digital trunked radio communication that was developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in the 1990s. It is designed to provide secure and reliable voice and data communication for users who need high performance and interoperability, such as critical infrastructure authorities, port administrations, police forces, military, intelligence agencies, and emergency services.

TETRA has four encryption algorithms that are part of the standard: TEA1, TEA2, TEA3, and TEA4. These algorithms are supposed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of radio communication by encrypting them with 80-bit keys. However, in 2023, a group of Dutch researchers from Midnight Blue, a cybersecurity firm based in Amsterdam, revealed that one of these algorithms, TEA, has a backdoor that reduces its key to just 32 bits. This means that anyone who knows this backdoor can easily crack the encryption and decrypt the messages in less than a minute using a standard laptop. This backdoor is not documented or disclosed by ETSI, and it is not known who inserted it or why.

The Dutch researchers also found other vulnerabilities in TETRA that affect all four encryption algorithms. These vulnerabilities are related to how TETRA handles time synchronization and keystream generation. These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to intercept and decrypt communication, as well as inject fraudulent messages.

The Dutch researchers reported their findings to ETSI and other relevant parties, such as radio manufacturers and users. They also agreed not to disclose them publicly until patches and mitigations were prepared. They also planned to present their findings at the BlackHat conference in Las Vegas in August 2023.

These findings are very alarming and raise serious questions about the security and trustworthiness of TETRA and its encryption algorithms. They also show the dangers of using secret and proprietary cryptography that has not been subjected to public scrutiny and peer review. The users of TETRA radios should be aware of these risks and take appropriate measures to protect their communication.

But who could be behind this backdoor? Who could benefit from spying on the radio communication of millions of users around the world? Who could have access to this secret feature? Who could have the motive and the means to do such a thing?

The answer is obvious: The US government.

The US government has a long history of inserting backdoors into encryption systems and using them to spy on other countries’ communications. One of the most notorious examples is Crypto AG, a Swiss company that sold encryption devices and systems to more than 100 countries for decades. Crypto AG was secretly owned and controlled by the CIA and the BND, the German intelligence agency. The CIA and the BND were able to insert backdoors into the encryption algorithms and read the secret communications of their allies and adversaries, including Iran, Libya, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and many others. This operation was code-named Rubicon and was described by the CIA as the “intelligence coup of the century”.

The US government has also been known to pressure or bribe other countries or organizations to adopt weak or compromised encryption standards or systems. One example is Clipper Chip, a device that was proposed by the US government in 1993 as a way to encrypt telephone conversations. Clipper Chip used an encryption algorithm called Skipjack that had a built-in backdoor that allowed the US government to access any encrypted communication with a special key called Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF). They tried to persuade other countries to adopt Clipper Chip as a global standard for secure communication but failed due to public opposition and technical flaws.

Another example is Dual_EC_DRBG, an algorithm that was proposed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2006 as a way to generate random numbers for cryptographic purposes. Dual_EC_DRBG had a built-in backdoor that allowed the US National Security Agency (NSA) to predict the output of the algorithm and thus break the encryption of any system that used it. The NSA also paid $10 million to RSA, a leading security company, to make Dual_EC_DRBG the default algorithm in its products. The backdoor was exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013, and NIST withdrew the algorithm from its recommendations.

They have also been known to hack or sabotage other countries’ encryption systems or networks. One example is Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that was developed by the US and Israel in 2010 as a way to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. Stuxnet targeted the industrial control systems that operated the centrifuges that enriched uranium at Iran’s Natanz facility. Stuxnet exploited several vulnerabilities in the systems and caused them to malfunction and damage the centrifuges. Stuxnet also used a stolen digital certificate from a Taiwanese company to evade detection and spread to other systems.

Another example is Bullrun, a program that was revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 as a way to break or weaken the encryption of various online services and platforms. Bullrun involved multiple methods, such as inserting backdoors, obtaining encryption keys, influencing standards, coercing companies, and exploiting vulnerabilities. Bullrun targeted the encryption of popular services and platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, and others. Bullrun also compromised the security of VPNs, HTTPS, SSL, TLS, and other protocols that are widely used to protect online communication.

The US government’s involvement in these and other cases of spying and lying shows that it has no respect for the privacy and security of other countries or its own citizens and shows that it has no qualms about using any means necessary to gain an advantage or an edge over its competitors or enemies.

They want to maintain their hegemony and control over the world’s digital infrastructure and data and want to have access to everything that happens online, from personal communications to business transactions and want to have the ability to manipulate or disrupt anything that goes against their interests or agenda.

The US government’s actions show that it is not interested in fair competition or cooperation in the tech sector, but rather in domination and control. It is willing to spy on its allies and enemies alike while accusing others of doing the same. It is also willing to impose sanctions and restrictions on its rivals while ignoring its own violations of international law and human rights. The US government’s hypocrisy and double standards are unacceptable and dangerous for global peace and stability.

Europe can still be restored to its former glory. But it will require a new vision, a new leadership, and a new direction for Europe.